Nominal realism is a branch of philosophical thought that holds that there is a real world that can be described using the language of common-sense. It is a form of realism that is distinct from scientific realism, which is based on scientific theories, and metaphysical realism, which is based on a priori principles. Nominal realism is based on the idea that there is an underlying reality that can be described using everyday language. It is the view that words and sentences used to describe reality have some kind of intrinsic meaning and that this intrinsic meaning is enough to accurately describe the world.
Nominal realism is closely related to linguistic determinism, which holds that the language we use to describe the world determines the way we think about it. This means that if we use different words to describe the same thing, we will have different perceptions of it. Nominal realism holds that this kind of language-based determinism is false, and that language can be used to accurately describe the world without necessarily changing our perception of it.
Nominal realism is often contrasted with scientific realism, which is the view that the world can be accurately described using the language of science. Scientific realism holds that scientific theories are accurate representations of the underlying reality and that they can be used to make predictions about the behavior of the world. Nominal realism, on the other hand, claims that science is not the only way to accurately describe the world and that everyday language can also be used to do so.
Nominal realism has been criticized by some for its lack of precision. Critics argue that everyday language is too imprecise and ambiguous to be used to accurately describe the world. They argue that scientific language is necessary to properly understand the underlying reality. Nominal realists counter this criticism by arguing that everyday language can still be used to accurately describe the world, albeit in a more approximate way than scientific language.
Nominal realism has been the subject of much debate and there are a number of different interpretations of the view. Some argue that nominal realism is compatible with scientific realism, while others argue that it is incompatible with scientific realism. The debate continues to this day and it is unlikely that it will be resolved any time soon.
References
Giere, R. N. (1988). Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Searle, J. R. (1979). The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press.
Sellars, W. (1956). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.