ANSCHAUUNG: A Phenomenological Theory of Perception
Perception is a fundamental component of cognition, and the way we experience the world is shaped by how we perceive it. The German term anschauung, or “intuition,” is a concept that has been used to describe how we experience something firsthand. This article will explore the concept of anschauung from a phenomenological perspective, defining its various components and discussing its implications for cognitive science.
Anschauung is defined as “the immediate perception of reality,” and it is closely associated with the concept of intuition. It is the idea that we can “see” something without needing to rely on the senses. This “seeing” is not necessarily visual; rather, it is a direct, immediate experience of something, whether it be a concept, an emotion, or a physical object. This experience is often experienced as a direct “knowing” of something, as if there is no need to use language or other symbols to make sense of it.
Anschauung is usually associated with the phenomenological tradition, which focuses on the study of experience. This tradition was developed by Edmund Husserl, who argued that the world is experienced through a direct, immediate perception of reality. He believed that this perception is not filtered through language or preconceived notions, but instead is experienced as a direct, unmediated experience. This theory has been further developed by other phenomenologists, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, who argued that the way we experience the world is shaped by our relationship with it.
Anschauung has implications for cognitive science, particularly in terms of our understanding of perception. It suggests that our experience of the world is not simply a product of our senses, but rather that there is an element of direct, intuitive experience that is involved. This could have implications for our understanding of how we interpret and make sense of the world around us.
Overall, the concept of anschauung sheds light on the way we experience the world. It suggests that we do not simply rely on our senses to interpret reality, but instead that there is an element of direct, intuitive experience involved in our perception. This could have implications for our understanding of perception and cognition and for how we make sense of the world around us.
References
Husserl, E. (1931). The phenomenology of internal time-consciousness. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). Phenomenology of perception. London, UK: Routledge.
Sartre, J. P. (1956). Being and nothingness. London, UK: Routledge.