The Zombie Argument is an argument in philosophical circles that suggests the possibility of physicalism, or the concept that only physical objects exist, being false. It was developed by philosopher David Chalmers in 1996 as a response to the Mind-Body Problem, which states that the mind cannot be explained through physical processes alone. In this argument, Chalmers posits that a zombie, a creature that is physically identical to a human but lacking conscious experience, could exist. This would mean that consciousness is not a product of physical processes, and physicalism is false. This article will discuss the implications of the zombie argument and its relevance to the Mind-Body Problem.
The zombie argument is based on the idea of conceivability, which states that if something can be conceived of, then it is possibly true. From this, Chalmers argues that since zombies are conceivable, then it is possible for them to exist. He states that since a zombie is physically identical to a human, but lacking conscious experience, then physical processes alone would still be able to produce a functioning creature; however, because it is lacking consciousness, physicalism must be false.
This argument has been met with a variety of responses. Some argue that zombies are not actually conceivable, as consciousness is an intrinsic property of humans and thus could not be separated from them. Others argue that the argument is too simplistic, as it does not account for other forms of consciousness, such as the non-human variety. Additionally, some have argued that the argument relies too heavily on the idea of conceivability, and that it does not provide any evidence to support its claims.
Despite these criticisms, the zombie argument remains an important contribution to the discussion surrounding the Mind-Body Problem. It provides a way to think about the issue that goes beyond the traditional physicalist perspective, and it allows us to consider the possibility that consciousness is not a product of physical processes. As such, it is a valuable tool for exploring the boundaries of this debate.
Overall, the zombie argument is an important contribution to the debate surrounding the Mind-Body Problem. It allows us to consider the possibility that physicalism is false, and that consciousness is not a product of physical processes. While it has been met with criticism, it remains an important part of the conversation, and it provides a valuable way of thinking about the Mind-Body Problem.
References
Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
Gomez, P. (2015). The Mind-Body Problem and the Zombie Argument. Philosophy Now, (115), 34-37.
O’Connor, T. (2008). The Mind-Body Problem. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-body/